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Paradox Lost: the Cost of  a Virtual World
Mark Halpern
Abstract
This paper touches on a number of  seemingly disparate topics—Artificial Intelligence, Fuzzy Logic, 
String Theory, the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, the Cantorian concept of  infinite sets—in 
order to support the thesis that for a large part of  the educated public in the Western world, the 
very concept of  reality has been changing over the last few generations, and that the change is being 
accelerated by our increasing acceptance of  the Virtual as a substitute for the traditional Real.  This, 
as I hope to convince you, is a momentous shift in the our world view, and like so many profound 
but gradual shifts, has gone largely unnoticed.   Whether the shift is ultimately a good thing or a 
bad, it ought not to go unscrutinized; this paper aims to bring it to public attention.  (The paradox 
whose loss  is referred to in the title is discussed at the end of  the paper.)
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Artificial Intelligence (AI)— the virtualizing of  the human mind
In another paper1, I argued that the Turing Test was invalid as a means of  establishing the 
claim that a computer might be said to think.  I was somewhat handicapped in arguing 
against that claim because I regarded it as absurd, and it is hard to argue effectively against 
what one regards as merely silly—one must perceive one’s opponents as giants, not mere 
windmills, if  one is to charge at them with all one’s force.  So I had to discipline myself  
to treat Turing’s arguments seriously, and argue as solemnly as if  in a court of  law against 
a position that I privately regarded as a house of  cards, fit to be knocked down by a puff  
of  wind or a scornful word from Alice.  I will not repeat here the arguments I offered in 
that paper; it is readily available to anyone who wishes to see them.  The only point about 
the Turing Test that I want to call attention to here is that it is close to being a conscious 
piece of  self  deception; it tells us, almost in so many words, that if  a computer can fool 
us into believing that it is thinking, than we must grant that it is thinking; in this matter, 
we are apparently living in an anti-Berkeleyan world where to seem is to be — percipi esse 
est.  Turing even implied, and some of  his epigones have said explicitly, that we believe that 
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other people think for the same reason; they seem to respond to questions much as we 
would, so we assume that they, like us, are thinking.
 Since Turing, a scientific genius, was not speaking ex tempore but presenting, in print, 
a well-considered opinion, something more specific than general human fallibility seems 
called for as an explanation for his adoption of  a view that seems nothing less than absurd2. 
My explanation is that Turing was lonely; first because it is in the nature of  things that a 
genius must be lonely, but also and more particularly because he was a homosexual in a 
society that strongly rejected homosexuality.  In seeing the computer as a potential friend 
he was by no means alone—many of  the strange beliefs I will be discussing are at bottom 
searches for a buddy—and the computer is not the most unlikely entity in which lonely 
man has attempted to find a friend.  But whatever the cause that led a genius of  Turing’s 
caliber to suppose a computer capable of  thought, I see in it a failure of  confidence in 
their own experience on the part of  modern cultivated people.  It is a failure that shows 
itself  again in our increasing preoccupation, sometimes even obsession, with the world of  
the Virtual—that is, of  things that do such a good job of  seeming that mere being cannot 
compete.  In explaining why I think this is so, I must begin by supporting my use of  the 
term absurd for the contention that we have already in some measure achieved Artificial 
Intelligence in the strong sense originated by Turing, and carried forward by McCarthy and 
Minsky.  
 What justifies that term, I think, is that the computer is often credited by AI champions 
with thinking on the basis of  just those characteristics that are most unlike real—that is, 
human — mental activity.  For example:
the computer is absolutely obedient — if  it does do something other than what 	
we have ordered it to do, we say that there’s a bug, and modify the program or 
hardware until it is again perfectly obedient.  
it has a perfect memory — as with obedience, if  it seems to have “forgotten” 	
anything it has been told, we test its memory and replace the faulty module when 
we find it.
it executes algorithms faultlessly and at great speed. 	
it never gets bored, never rebels, never initiates any new action or topic, and is quite 	
content with endlessly repetitive tasks (what we usually call, tellingly, ‘mindless 
repetition’).  
 These attributes are the very antithesis of  human mental behavior— so much so that I 
suggest that the computer might best be regarded as the first machine man has ever made 
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that does not think.  It never behaves spontaneously or mysteriously, never appears to have 
its own ideas, never seems to have a mind of  its own.  (By “never behaves mysteriously” I 
mean that it never behaves in a way that, when closely examined, is incomprehensible; for 
observers too busy to follow its workings in detail, of  course, it is always mysterious—but 
then, everything is mysterious to the inattentive.)  If  nevertheless the computer seems 
to be thinking, that is precisely because, being unable to “think for itself,” it’s the perfect 
repository for and executor of  human thought.  Virtually every other machine that man has 
created is likely to misbehave from its owner’s point of  view; the computer stands alone in 
being perfectly subservient to its human masters.
 And it was Turing himself, in what was probably his finest piece of  work, who so 
defined the computer as to show why it is so apt a vehicle for algorithm execution.  He 
coined for the computer, or at least put into general circulation, the term finite state machine, 
meaning a machine that can assume only a fixed, known number of  internal configurations 
or states, each of  which can be infallibly distinguished from any other by a test that can be 
performed at any time, and each of  which the machine can be caused to assume by some 
finite number of  available operations.  The computer, in short, is a uniquely constrained 
machine; unlike other useful artifacts, it has a completely determinate number of  degrees 
of  freedom (or ‘free parameters’), and this inability to deviate into an undefined or 
unforeseeable state makes it a perfect executor of  our algorithms, and the only possible 
vehicle for the immensely long programs that realize human intentions. And so good is 
the properly programmed computer at performing useful tasks that spectators may begin 
to murmur that the computer is thinking — and, amazingly, not only innocent spectators, 
but sometimes even the very programmers who have laboriously developed the programs 
whose effects they now marvel at.
 Only slightly less amazing than those programmers who, after working hard for months 
and years to get an important program behaving correctly, wonder if  the computer is 
thinking, we have the other experts who believe that they have exhibited computers 
thinking, but bemoan the fact that they receive little credit for doing so.  AI champions 
and enthusiasts have often expressed their chagrin at the fact that their achievements, 
however surprising and counter-intuitive when they are first announced, are always soon 
downgraded in the public mind to the status of  routine, even boring, computer-science 
progress.  A typical complaint is this from Martha Pollack, professor at the AI Laboratory 
of  the University of  Michigan and executive editor of  the Journal of  Artificial Intelligence 
Research:
It’s a crazy position to be in.  As soon as we solve a problem, instead of looking at the 
solution as AI, we come to view it as just another computer system.3
 One sympathizes with Professor Pollack and her colleagues, but there is no help for 
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them; they are no doubt familiar with Clarke’s Law—Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic—but may not have appreciated that “is indistinguishable from” 
is a symmetric relation, equally capable of  yielding Halpern’s Corollary—Any sufficiently 
explained magic is indistinguishable from technology.
 It should be observed, too, that AI applications are founded on no theory of  the nature 
of  intelligence.   We have gotten the computer to do whatever it does despite having 
no complete, or perhaps even rudimentary, theory of  intelligence—and how could we 
have built a machine that thinks without thoroughly understanding thinking? To build a 
thinking machine, we would have to accomplish something not merely beyond our present 
powers, but perhaps impossible in principle: we must thoroughly comprehend our own 
minds, stand outside ourselves as observers, pick ourselves up by our own bootstraps. If  
we can do this, then indeed we will have taken a momentous step in the evolution of  our 
species—but we have not yet done it.  And if  someday we do, will we need to—will we 
want to—build a machine that reflects this knowledge of  what thinking really is?  As some 
wag has noted, all we would achieve by building a thinking robot — an artificial person — 
is reproduction without sex, when the human race seems to want just the opposite. 
 Nothing more will be said here about the shortcomings of  Artificial Intelligence; the 
point I hope to leave you with as I move to another topic is that in AI we have highly 
intelligent and accomplished people believing propositions that are so easily shown to be 
invalid that they fully deserve the label absurd, and that the phenomenon is one deserving 
of  investigation.
Fuzzy Logic: the virtualizing of  problems of  precision
“Fuzzy Logic” (FL), a concept and term created in 1973 by Lotfi Zadeh, professor 
of  computer science at the University of  California at Berkeley, purports to be a new 
approach to dealing with problems about which we have incomplete information, 
and one that represents an advance in logic.  It has proven a much more popular 
concept in Japan, for some reason, than in the U.S. or Europe, and you can buy 
Japanese appliances that, it is claimed, were designed with the aid of  FL.  Here in 
the U.S. it has its champions and its detractors—a Google search on fuzzy logic will 
retrieve a torrent of  papers and arguments by both sides—but in the discussion 
that follows, I reject the arguments of  both sides.  Instead, I contend that FL 
is a highly useful development that is as widely misunderstood by its champions 
as by its critics.  (In the course of  discussing FL I make occasional allusions to 
mathematical or physical findings and results that may or may not be familiar—
they are present only for the entertainment of  the technically sophisticated; my 
argument does not depend on such technicalities, but only on common experience 
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and common sense.  Also, I have not bothered to distinguish here between FL, the 
theory, and Fuzzy Control, its principal application; for present purposes they may 
be regarded as one thing.)
 Between the rigor and precision of  the exact sciences and the confused messiness of  
most of  life stands engineering, which attempts to apply the discoveries of  the former to 
the problems of  the latter.  The process requires engineers to know a lot of  science—at 
least of  the findings of  science—but also to have the ability to operate with less than perfect 
information, to apply that mysterious resource called common sense, to have an instinct 
for when to yield and when to press. And all of  us, whatever our business cards say, are to 
some extent engineers; we all find ourselves in situations about which our information is 
in part exact, in part nebulous, and all have to use that mixed bag in dealing with practical 
situations.  
 But the stark contrast between one part of  our knowledge and the other can be 
stultifying and paralyzing; given on the one hand exact numerical information, and on 
the other vague, imprecise, often subjective inputs and requirements, many people just 
freeze at the controls, and cannot get on with the job.  The problem arises in working 
with kitchen recipes, for example: some people have to know exactly how much salt to 
add to the batter, and are baffled and incapacitated when their grandmothers tell them to 
add “a pinch” or—even worse—“enough.” And when in the kitchen-like processing of  
industrial materials the same problem arises, and the people who have learned through 
experience say that at a certain point you have to “raise the temperature a bit” or “give it a 
little more juice,” many scientifically-trained operators are helpless; “How much do I raise 
the temperature?” or “What do you mean by ‘a little more’?” they cry plaintively, and they 
can’t act until the question is answered.
 This is the practical problem addressed, and at least partially solved, by FL. A system 
designed in accordance with FL principles allows a user to enter instructions in the loose 
form he’s comfortable with, without worrying about their exact meaning.  And somewhere 
in the bowels of  the system—usually within the computer controlling it—a mysterious 
process takes place whereby the vagueness is resolved and transformed into precise control 
information: “raise the temperature by 3.2 degrees centigrade” or “add 200cc/second of  
reagent A.”  The process, seen from the outside, calls to mind the classic cartoon in which 
a theoretical physicist is going through a long and complicated chain of  mathematical 
reasoning at the whiteboard, and, pointing to one particularly abstruse expression, says “At 
this point a miracle occurs.”
 In the case of  an FL system the miracle is easily explained: somewhere in the innards 
of  the system is a table (or algorithm—it doesn’t matter which for our purposes4)—that 
transforms the vague expressions into precise values; that says, for example, “’a little’ means 
200cc/second” and “’heat gently’ means raise temperature by 3.2 degrees centigrade.” 
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That table enables the human operator to do what he often cannot do without help: 
stop dithering and act in some reasonable, though possibly imperfect, way.  And the table 
was created by some human being—a human being who may well be just as unable to 
take action without exact information as the user who is rescued by it, who may even be 
the very same person. But—and this is the deep secret of  FL—the table or algorithm which 
replaces vagueness with precision was created at another time, in another place, and under very different 
circumstances.  
 The table’s creator did not have to worry about the practical effect of  equating “a 
little” to 3.2, because at the moment he established that equivalence there was no pressing 
problem before him, just a rather academic, non-urgent decision as to what “a little” might 
reasonably mean.  And later, when there was a pressing problem to deal with, the user 
(who may even be, as noted, the very one who earlier created the table of  equivalences) 
will be able to give the system a “vague” instruction without taking responsibility for the 
interpretation the system will put on it; that responsibility is someone else’s. 
 By decoupling the act of  defining “a little” from that of  using the term in anger, and 
letting each act be performed by a different person—or one person on two distinctly 
different occasions, wearing a very different hat on each—FL breaks the impasse, and lets 
us get on with the job.  This means, of  course, that FL has nothing to do with logic, fuzzy 
or smooth; it is simply a psychological trick we play on ourselves to get past one of  our 
inhibitions—a trick something like the placebo in clinical medicine. It is also like the legal 
entity that the United States calls a corporation and England a limited liability company—a 
device for protecting investors from any loss beyond their investment by means of  the 
creation of  an artificial legal person who bears the responsibility for its acts, as if  it were 
a natural person. And it is also like the device whereby the members of  a firing squad are 
spared at least some of  the guilt feelings that might otherwise haunt them—the device of  
secretly inserting a blank cartridge into one of  the rifles, so that each squad member can 
entertain the hope that his was the rifle that fired the blank.
 One point here is worth repeating: the process whereby a fuzzy input is converted into 
a (sufficiently) precise one is either algorithmic or rule-of-thumb, either theory-based or 
empirical; we either have some rigorous basis for saying that “a little” means “3.2 ounces,” 
or we’re just making a “reasonable guess.”  Those who claim that the former is the case, 
and that FL rests on new insights in logic or scientific method, must be prepared to display 
that discovery. If  they cannot display it, then FL has no pretensions to being an advance in 
logic; the benefit of  a FL-based system can only be that it lets us get on with the job rather 
than get bogged down in gazing into our navels for a definition of  “a little.”
 In my experience, FL apologists forever blur this critical distinction; they cannot 
display a rigorous basis for turning “a little” into “3.2 cc,” but they want to believe that if  
the process of  conversion is very complex, and involves a lot of  calculation, somehow the 
missing rigor is supplied by that very process.  But a sow’s ear cannot be turned into a silk 
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purse by processing, however elaborate; as programmers used to say, garbage in, garbage 
out. Defenses and explanations of  the FL process, which somehow never come to grips 
with this point, mask the simple fact that at its foundation is a set of  arbitrary and merely 
common-sensical decisions—something to conceal and be ashamed of  only because the 
process is being touted as hard science and irrefutable logic. 
 None of  the foregoing should be taken as an accusation that FL is useless.  On the 
contrary, such inhibition-suppressing and action-releasing devices are enormously valuable, 
and the inventor of  this one, Lotfi Zadeh, is to be thanked and congratulated.  What he has 
given us, however, is not a contribution to logic or scientific method, but a tool with which 
we can overcome the Hamlet-like inhibitions that so often bind the best souls among 
us in dealing with recalcitrant reality—a tool that works, we may say, by ‘virtualizing’ the 
decision process.
Curled-up Dimensions: the virtualizing of  spatial perception
Albert Einstein cannot be held responsible for the misuse made of  some of  his ideas and 
utterances.  It’s not his fault that many people think that the General Theory of  Relativity, 
his revolutionary concept of  how gravity shapes space, somehow means that nothing is 
really true, since everything is really relative to … well, something.  Nor is it his fault that 
many people think that there is a fourth dimension that, if  they keep their eyes wide open, 
they will be able to spot someday before it can get away.  Modern physicists, however, 
are largely responsible for a kind of  confusion that is widespread among the general, 
non-scientific population, and that originated with Einstein’s great discoveries. That is the 
notion that science has discovered a fourth, fifth, or even an eleventh dimension that you 
can see, apparently, only if  you have a PhD in physics.  This misconception is a serious 
one, because it seems to confirm the non-scientists’ gloomy feeling that what scientists are 
talking about is utterly beyond them, and that it’s hopeless to try to understand anything 
they say—not the frame of  mind that we want an enlightened citizenry to be in.
 What the scientists are saying can indeed be hard to understand, but not because it’s 
too technical, as the public thinks, but because it’s too poetical.  And not only is it more 
like a poem than a theorem or equation, it’s also poor poetry—and poor poetry is the most 
corrupting of  all types of  discourse.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge, discussing critics of  poetry, 
said
The question should be fairly stated, how far a man can be an adequate, or even a 
good (so far as he goes) though inadequate critic of poetry, who is not a poet, at least 
in posse.  Can he be an adequate, can he be a good critic, though not commensurate? 
But there is yet another distinction.  Suppose he is not only not a poet, but is a bad 
poet!  What then? 5
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 I would ask the same question, only replacing Coleridge’s “critic of  poetry” by 
“explainer of  science.”  We ordinary folks perceive three dimensions, no more, no less. 
So do scientists; so did Einstein.  But when it was found that time, no less than space, 
needed to be considered in understanding some physical phenomena, scientists ventured 
into the unfamiliar realm of  figurative speech, the mode characteristic of  poetry, and did 
it poorly.  
 To fix the location of  a point in ordinary Euclidean space, as represented in a Cartesian 
graph, we specify numerically its distance along each of  three axes from some agreed-upon 
fixed point called the origin.  And because there are three dimensions, it takes three numbers 
to specify the location of  a point in such a space.  This fact established in everyone’s mind 
a correlation between the number of  dimensions and the number of  magnitudes that 
had to be measured: three dimensions, three measured quantities.  But then it was found 
that for some purposes a fourth quantity had to be specified: time.  And the agreement 
between number of  dimensions and number of  quantities that needed to be specified was 
extended “poetically”: if  it now took four quantities to describe some phenomenon, then 
by a simple reversal of  cause and effect, there must be, or could be considered to be, four 
dimensions.
 Of  course time is not a dimension in the proper—that is, the common—sense; 
it is one only by courtesy.  Like the three spatial dimensions, it must be specified by a 
number representing its distance from some agreed-on starting point—a point physicists 
conventionally label t0.    But unlike those three, its numerical specification does not measure 
a spatial distance—it is a dimension only figuratively, not literally.  And this figure of  
speech, this primitive bit of  poetry, has been a prolific cause of  confusion, suggesting to 
generations of  laymen that there is a fourth direction in space that is just as real as the 
three we know, but very hard to detect.  Some consequences of  this confusion may be 
merely ridiculous, such as the temptation experienced by more than one child I know to 
whirl about suddenly, hoping to catch sight of  the fourth dimension before it can escape. 
And many is the portentous half-baked theory about what it would mean to “enter” the 
fourth dimension, and many the fantasies about the strange creatures we would find 
there.  Perhaps the only good thing about this error of  taking literally the term “fourth 
dimension” is the spur that it gave the writers of  science fiction, horror stories, and wildly 
imaginative literature in general.  But if  that is a good consequence, it is the only one; for 
the rest, its effect has been wholly negative.
 It was bad enough when those who lacked any scientific education thought there were 
four dimensions; all right, they thought, not being a scientist, I can see only three of  them, 
but three out of  four isn’t too bad, is it?  But now we learn that the theoretical physicists 
who are working in string theory, one of  the current approaches to a unified theory of  
physics that will subsume both relativity and quantum mechanics, have determined that 
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they need eleven dimensions if  their theory is to work.  These new dimensions, they tell us, 
are invisible because they are (a) unimaginably tiny, and (b) “curled up” inside other things. 
All of  this, of  course, is poetry—junk poetry.  What the theorists mean is that in order to 
get their theory to hang together and yield the results they want, they need to postulate the 
existence of  seven further quantities that are dimensions only in the same sense that time 
is a dimension.  
 In part, the notion of  dimensions beyond the familiar three is due to a simple logical 
error: supposing that if  we need four (or eleven) quantities, there must be four (or eleven) 
dimensions is like supposing that if  for every A there’s a B, then for every B there must be 
an A.  By that reasoning, just as for every baby there must be a woman who bore it, so for 
every woman there must be a baby she bore.  But this fallacy is too easily seen through; 
the seemingly endless proliferation of  dimensions would not be taking place if  there were 
no deeper root.  And there is: it is our need to find analogies, models, comprehensible 
patterns that relate these increasingly abstract discoveries to something we already know. 
The last time theoretical physics made a discovery that lent itself  to such treatment, it was 
Newton’s, in the 18th century; we had all whirled objects around ourselves at the end of  
strings, or at least could readily imagine doing so, and if  we called the string “gravity,” we 
could entertain the hope that we had some sort of  understanding of  that force.  
 But when in the 19th century Maxwell produced the ideas and equations that gathered 
together electricity, light, and magnetism, we could no longer do even that much.  We 
revealed our failure when we supposed that if  all these phenomena were waves, as Maxwell 
told us, there had to be a medium through which waves might propagate, and invented 
the aether to fill that role.  But then experimentation showed that there was no such thing, 
and we realized that our mental picture was nothing like the reality.  And when in the 20th 
century Einstein told us what we had to think about space, time, signal propagation, and 
the relationship of  mass to energy if  we wanted to understand some otherwise inexplicable 
phenomena, we were utterly defeated. A few components of  Einstein’s vision could be 
illustrated with analogies from human experience: we were shown pictures of  heavy ball 
bearings sinking into thin rubber sheets, and were told that this was how mass distorted 
space, and there were comparisons of  clocks aboard speeding trains with other clocks that 
had remained in the station, and we grasped a little of  the idea of  time dilation.  But the 
essentials of  the General Theory of  Relativity are so counter-intuitive, so at odds with 
ordinary human experience, that the notion of  understanding it in the same sense in which 
we understand physical reality on the human level is hopeless.
 It was something of  a reductio ad absurdum when Einstein himself  complained about 
quantum mechanics, the theory that relates many of  the phenomena of  nature that 
relativity does not address, that he couldn’t accept it because he couldn’t understand it—
that is, couldn’t make it feel right even though it was superb at enabling us to predict the 
behavior of  the phenomena it dealt with.  Einstein’s reputation among other physicists 
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suffered from his emotional rejection of  the indeterminacy of  quantum mechanics, but in 
fact in doing so Einstein was making yet another contribution to human thought.  He was 
telling us that even he, the very archetype of  the scientific genius, could not understand 
the latest developments of  physics in the sense that we had once understood scientific 
discoveries, and the sense in which we have always wanted to understand them.  And this 
lesson, if  we had absorbed it, might have made us stop calling the new entities whose 
existence we had to postulate “dimensions”, in a futile effort to make them seem homely, 
familiar things.  All that such junk poetry does is to confuse us further, since by no stretch 
of  the imagination can we come to grips with eleven dimensions, no matter how tiny or 
curled up.
 The physicist Brian Greene tries to show us what such “curling up” means in his 
recent best-seller on modern theoretical physics, asking you, his reader, to contemplate a 
picture of  a stretched-out garden hose seen from so far away that it looks like a mere one-
dimensional line.6  Then he asks you to come closer; when close enough, he points out, you 
will perceive that the hose has a second dimension: thickness.  Just so, he contends, if  we 
could come close enough to some inconceivably minute entities in space called “strings,” 
we would see that they somehow enclosed dimensions far beyond the familiar three.  But 
this analogy is nonsense: the observer who at first thought the hose one-dimensional made 
that mistake not because he thought that there is only one dimension, but simply because 
he was too far away to see the hose in sufficient detail.  He was already aware that there 
are three dimensions, and as soon as he got close enough to the hose, he immediately and 
without the slightest difficulty granted it existence in (at least) two of  those dimensions. 
His experience is radically different from that of  being asked to perceive not just that 
some object when examined closely has more dimensions than it appeared to have when 
seen from far away, but that there exist more dimensions than he ever knew about or can 
observe or conceive. 
 In the one case, the observer simply made a trivial error of  estimation because of  
the limitations of  human eyesight; in the other, he is shown nothing—you don’t get to 
“see” a curled up dimension no matter how close you get—but asked to acknowledge the 
existence of  several additional dimensions, apparently on no better grounds than that he 
was initially wrong about the dimensionality of  the garden hose, and therefore owes it to 
the physicist to atone for his mistake by conceding that strings have eleven dimensions.
 The truth is that modern theoretical physics is almost entirely a branch of  mathematics, 
and can only be understood as such.  It differs from other branches of  mathematics in that 
its practitioners try to draw from it physically observable consequences, like the bending 
of  light rays by massive objects, but the experimentalists who attempt such observations 
are only following in the wake of  the theoreticians, attempting to corroborate or refute 
the predictions of  the theoreticians’ equations; they are not primarily trying to make 
discoveries of  their own.  (They may in the course of  checking a theory come up with 
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some unforeseen phenomena that the theorists, in turn, will have to consider in their 
theorizing, but that is just a happy side-effect when it occurs.)  Modern theoretical physics 
has sailed far, far beyond the coastal waters of  common sense and common experience, 
where you could navigate by reference to natural landmarks and lighthouses; we are now 
sailing on the open ocean, far out of  sight of  land, and must lay our course solely by means 
of  the stars, clocks and logic.  No one will ever again understand the findings of  science in 
the traditional sense of  making them compatible with our deepest intuitions about space 
and time; insofar as they can be understood in any sense, they can be understood only by 
those who have the requisite mathematical training.  And the efforts of  popularizers to 
make them available to the public through the analogies and models and figures of  speech 
that I’ve called “junk poetry” are not only doomed to failure, they can have no effect other 
than to increase the public’s confusion, as witness the career of  “dimension.”
SETI & UFOs: virtualizing the search for knowledge
  The search for extraterrestrial intelligence—SETI, as the knowing call it—is so important 
to some people that it was actually funded for some time by the U. S. Government.  The 
official rationale for this subsidy was that if  we can make contact with intelligent beings 
from elsewhere than Earth, we can benefit from their presumably highly advanced 
technology. The number of  implausibilities and improbabilities silently glossed over in 
this claim is of  astronomical magnitude.7
   So far, not a single place has been found in the extraterrestrial universe where the 
conditions thought to be necessary for life are known to be present—liquid, surface water 
being only the first of  many. But let’s waive this objection; after all, we’ve examined only 
an infinitesimally small fraction even of  just our own galaxy, let alone the universe, so no 
conclusions should be drawn from our failure so far.  Let’s suppose that we get an answer to 
some message we’ve sent out8, thus finding not just life, but intelligent life, somewhere out 
there.  And let’s stipulate that the source of  the reply is only a few light-years away, so that 
something approaching a conversation is possible. Now what?  Presumably we know that 
we are in touch with intelligent beings because the signals we receive have some regularity 
to them; they will convey some mathematical sequence, such as the squares of  the first n 
integers9.  Good; now we know that just a few light-years out there is an intelligent entity 
that (a) can receive and send signals of  the type that we have been transmitting, (b) shares 
with us at least arithmetic reasoning, and (c) is willing to make contact with us, at least 
intellectually.  
   Now how do we pass from this stage to that of  building a common language with the 
extraterrestrials so that we can communicate about more than elementary number theory? 
It may be that human ingenuity will come up with some clever means of  doing this, but 
none has been proposed yet, as far as I know, and if  we are to spend many millions of  
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dollars and much valuable talent on this project, at least some idea should be available as 
to how we would proceed if  its first step were successful.  
   Supposing this requirement somehow met, the next questions to arise are these: why 
should we suppose that the science and technology possessed by this alien being or 
species are superior to ours?  And why should that being or species be willing to pass 
its knowledge to us, gratis?  And if  they do have valuable knowledge, and are willing to 
give it to us, would we be wise to accept it?  The dangers of  such a windfall of  unearned 
knowledge is just what Lessing had in mind when he said that if  God offered him a choice 
between effortless possession of  knowledge and a passion for discovering knowledge, 
he would choose the latter.  Whether it’s answers or advice or praise, what you get for 
nothing is notorious for being worth nothing—the intellectual equivalent of  junk food. 
And of  course there is always the possibility that the alien beings we manage to contact 
will be hostile, and capable of  making their hostility felt.  This is a consideration routinely 
dismissed by SETI enthusiasts as “paranoid,” although the difficulty we earthlings have in 
getting along among ourselves suggests that the difficulties of  getting along with alien life 
forms, even if  they felt no animosity toward us, might be very great.  
 The fact that the U.S. Government has spent, and is still spending, millions of  dollars 
on SETI without seeking serious answers to these questions, and the many others that are 
their corollaries and consequences, suggests that the funding of  that project was, in official 
eyes, just a kind of  hush money paid to quiet the complaints and retain the services of  
space enthusiasts.
   To show that my point of  view is not solely that of  knuckle-dragging troglodytes and 
short-sighted Luddites, here is the opinion of  one of  the world’s leading experts on 
biology:
Even if something parallel to the origin of human intelligence should indeed have 
happened somewhere in the infinite universe, the chance that we would be able to 
communicate with it must be considered as zero.  Yes, for all practical purposes, man 
is alone.10
 And while the SETI project is certainly, like AI, another of  the quests for non-human 
friends, it is something else as well: it is a form of  Cargo Cult, in which the entire human 
race plays the role of  a tribe of  technologically undeveloped island-bound peoples, waiting 
for some beings in the sky to deliver marvels to them, just as some South Pacific islanders 
are reportedly still expecting American ships or planes to visit them as they did during 
World War 2, bringing goods of  such variety and quantity as to establish a new quasi-
religious cult among the recipients.
 The pro-SETI party does not take criticism well; it is a party of  enthusiasts and 
determined optimists who regard critics as sour, unimaginative fellows who are best 
ignored.  Here is a specimen of  pro-SETI cheer leading, chosen because it is a little more 
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coherent than most such expressions: 
How easy it is to scoff at `desperate’ seekers of aliens, as the science-fiction 
writer Brian Aldiss did in these pages two years ago (Nature 409, 1080; 2001). 
He touched some nerves: aliens are indeed as real as ghosts or numerous deities 
(in other words, they continue to be purely imaginary); their fictitious portrayals 
impede understanding; their air of being the product of scientific thinking is indeed 
spurious. But when all was said and done, his put-down, although erudite, was 
ultimately no more than a stimulating polemic.
Other prominent sceptics have been more soberingly analytical. Peter Ward and 
Donald Brownlee, in their book Rare Earth (Coperni cus/Springer, 2000), discussed 
various factors that, on the face of it, conspire to make the emergence of life around 
stars probable but the appearance of intelligent species almost impossible. “Is that 
it?”; one might ask when faced by the likelihood that we are, alas, the pinnacle of our 
Galaxy’s intelligence. And according to a theory discussed at last week’s meeting of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, if it wasn’t for the chance 
mutation of the FOXP2 gene 50 millennia ago, we wouldn’t have the creativity to 
explore these ideas.
Yet more cold water has been poured on our hopes that we have intelligent company 
in a recent collection of answers to Enrico Fermi’s pointed question about the lack 
of visitors: “Where is everybody?”.  In a sceptical book of that title (Copernicus/
Springer, 2002), Stephen Webb’s explanations for the absence of alien visitors range 
from: “They are here and they call themselves Hungarians”, attributed to Budapest-
born physicist Leo Szilard, to: “Science is not inevitable”; science being one of 
many improbable developmental steps from primitive organisms to interstellar 
communication or travel.
A pox on such pan-Galactic pessimism. These arguments may give sober government 
agencies an excuse to stop funding searches for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI), as 
the US Congress did over a decade ago. But the rest of us should look more favourably 
on such expressions of the fundamental yearnings of humanity. All credit to the likes 
of William Hewlett, David Packard and Paul Allen, whose funds have allowed the 
SETI projects to establish new technologies — albeit still pitifully insensitive if we 
are to detect the equivalent of Friends leaking through some planetary ionosphere 
1,000 light years away. All credit too to the tens of researchers who devote themselves 
to the dispiriting quest for such electromagnetic detritus. The rest of us should drag 
ourselves away from revivals of ET, Close Encounters and Taken long enough to scan 
the latest ambitions of the SETI institute, outlined in SETI2020 (http://www.seti.
org), and send it a donation for the hunt for the real Thing.11
 Fascinating to learn that it was the writer of  science fiction who rejected SETI as 
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being science fiction, while the presumably level-headed and critical editor(s) of  Nature, 
one of  the two foremost scientific journals of  the English-speaking world, can only 
say “A pox on such pan-Galactic pessimism.”  And what a devastating charge to bring 
against government agencies, calling them “sober”!
 But for some, the problem of  making contact with intelligent extraterrestrial beings 
has been solved already: we need not search for them, because they have come to us, 
riding in the vehicles we call Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs).   The existence of  
UFOs is of  course not in doubt; one can hardly look up at the sky without noting all 
kinds of  things up there, or seeming to be up there, that one cannot identify.  Even after 
eliminating the floaters in their own eyes that so many mistake for distant objects, there are 
plenty of  UFOs.  By the same token, the land and the sea are full of  unknown objects—
objects unknown, at least, to untrained observers—but Unidentified Creeping Objects 
and Unidentified Swimming Objects do not evoke much interest, because one can hardly 
suppose them to be modern visitors from outer space.  
 The question, of  course, is what reason we have to suppose that the unknown objects 
seen up in the sky are such visitors.  My answer is that we have no rational reason to do 
so.  There have not been many fully recorded sightings of  UFOs (I will henceforth use 
“UFO” to mean something supposed to be an extraterrestrial vehicle), and those few are 
unimpressive, to put it mildly.  Why is there not a single clear and undoubtedly authentic 
photograph of  a UFO?  There are millions of  cameras in North America and Europe 
alone, and some observers have had their cameras with them at the time of  a sighting, 
and managed to snap a picture or two—but not one such picture offers a clear image. 
The evidence for the existence of  UFOs consists entirely of  eye witness reports, and 
anyone with experience in the criminal justice system or in clinical psychology knows 
that eye witness reports are generally unreliable, even when the witnesses are intelligent, 
honest, and unprejudiced.  So we need not enquire whether reporters of  sightings are 
people hungry for attention, or members of  the Chamber of  Commerce of  Roswell, New 
Mexico—even in the absence of  such corrupting factors, these reports deserve very little 
credence.
 But the objection that has greatest force, I think, is one founded on the behavior of  
the supposedly intelligent beings operating the UFOs: why have they neither completely 
hidden themselves from us, nor made open contact with us?   They came to earth for 
some reason, presumably, and they have tremendous technical capabilities.  Surely they 
are capable of  concealing themselves from us if  they wish to, and equally they are capable 
of  landing and demanding of  the nearest human (if  they are not afraid of  clichés) “take 
me to your leader!”  But they have done neither; instead they have let their vehicles be 
seen by a very few human observers, but never closely enough nor long enough to allow 
unambiguous identification of  those vehicles, much less themselves, to be made.  Why? 
What can be their motives for coming all this way, only to behave in so pointless a fashion? 
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My conclusion is that such behavior is inconsistent with the intelligence that would be 
required to build an inter-stellar space craft, and that therefore alien-carrying UFOs are 
non-existent.  And the broader SETI movement, though not necessarily linked to the UFO 
cult, is nevertheless another troubling transposition of  our quest for friends, support, and 
technical progress to the virtual realm, where the conflicts and complications of  the actual 
can be waved away.
Cantorian Sets: virtualizing the concept of  the infinite
One concept corrupts and confuses the others.  I am not speaking of the Evil whose 
limited sphere is ethics; I am speaking of the Infinite.
—Jorge Luis Borges, “Avatars of the Tortoise,” Otras Inquisiciones
In an earlier section I said that many of  the names mathematicians assign to the objects 
they generate were “punk poetry”—that is, weak metaphors whose figurative nature 
tends to be quickly forgotten, and which turn out to be seriously misleading even to many 
intelligent and educated laymen.  In that section, I was specifically concerned with the use 
made by advanced mathematical physicists of  the term “dimension” to label the extra 
parameters they found necessary to make their theories (e.g., string theory) coherent.  Here 
I’m concerned with the use of  the term “infinite” in describing sets that conform to the 
criterion proposed by Georg Cantor (1845-1918)—namely, that their elements can be put 
into one-to-one correspondence with their own proper subsets.  Cantor’s position, now 
accepted by the vast majority of  working mathematicians, is that the same general method 
used to compare finite sets for size is available for infinite sets as well, which can likewise 
be ranked by size.  And in doing so, he and his disciples tell us, he makes rigorous and 
precise our formerly nebulous idea of  the infinite.
What Cantor did vs. what he thought he’d done
I think Cantor achieved something important, but was mistaken about the nature of  that 
achievement.  What he did, I suggest, was to deal with the problem of  measuring infinite sets 
as Alexander solved the problem of  untying the Gordian Knot—he rejected the problem 
as stated, and transformed it into another, more tractable one.  By inventing transfinite 
numbers, he assigned infinite sets a cardinality; this made it possible to treat infinite sets just 
as if  they were finite sets, and compare them in size by pairing off  their members against 
other infinite sets—and it worked.  The move produces useful mathematical results—
but one observes that the results have nothing to do with the traditional infinite, which 
cannot be so treated, as every philosopher and mathematician from Aristotle to Gauss 
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and Poincaré agreed.  What Cantor did was not to refine or clarify our concept of  the 
traditional infinite, but to invent a wholly new object, the Cantorian Set.  His achievement 
is much like that of  the geometers who explored the consequences of  letting traditional 
parallel lines converge or diverge; they taught us nothing about Euclidean space, which 
remains a realm where parallels remain the same distance apart forever—what they did 
was to create wholly new kinds of  “space,” which have their own independent value.  As 
Columbus sought a better route to the Indies, but instead discovered the New World, 
Cantor sought to capture the infinite, and instead invented a new kind of  number.
 Such cases of  important discoveries or inventions that are misunderstood by their 
discoverers, or so misnamed as to be misunderstood by others, are quite common. 
Mathematicians and physicists regularly commandeer common terms, use them to label 
more or less related abstract constructs that are more amenable to formal manipulation, 
and then tell users of  those terms in their traditional senses that they are misusing them. 
The discussion of  “dimension” above offers one example; here is another, especially 
blatant one offered both in a book by a modern writer on science, and in a widely respected 
reference work:
Democritus of the fifth century B.C. held the true belief that all matter is made of 
particles so tiny as to be invisible: atoms.  Although Democritus’ works are lost, it is 
unlikely he had anything we would consider valid evidence.  His was a philosophical 
insight that turned out to be right.  (The serendipity is less striking for the fact that the 
atoms of twentieth-century physics are not indivisible as Democritus thought.)12
 In the first decade of  the 19th century, John Dalton, supposing he had found the 
fundamental, non-decomposable unit of  physical reality (which later would be shown 
to be ‘splittable’ into even more primitive entities) assigned the name ‘atom’ to it.  He 
thereby created a misnomer, and his error is seen by Poundstone as casting discredit on 
Democritus—his ‘serendipity’ is tarnished.  And The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th edition, 
s.v. ‘atom’, falls into the same anachronism, telling readers that ”…the atom is not at all 
indivisible, as the ancient philosophers thought, but can undergo a number of  possible 
changes.”
 In much the same way Cantor applies the term “infinite” to an invention of  his own, 
and then criticizes earlier thinkers for their misuse of  the term.  What makes it evident that 
the ‘infinite’ of  Cantor’s vision is not that of  all earlier Western thought is the corollary that 
some infinities are bigger than other infinities—indeed, that there is an infinite hierarchy of  
progressively bigger infinities.  The notion that one infinite set can be larger than another 
implies that infinity is a quantity or magnitude, and as such capable of  being measured, 
when what we have called the infinite up to the time of  Cantor is not a magnitude (if  it 
is anything for which we have a name, it is a process: “…and another one, and another 
one…”), and it makes no sense to call one example of  it bigger than another.  What do 
we mean by bigger?  When dealing with finite sets, we call set A bigger than set B if  every 
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element of  A can be paired off  with an element of  B until there are no more elements 
in B, but at least one still in A.  This cannot be done, of  course, with infinite sets, so the 
traditional notion of  bigger or smaller has no application.  Consider that the pairing-off  
process has no significance in itself; it is only when that process terminates in the exhaustion 
of  (at least) one of  the two sets involved that a conclusion can be reached as to the relative 
sizes of  the two.  But since inexhaustibility is the very definition of  a (traditional) infinite 
set, that moment of  truth cannot arrive.  The reason why one cannot reach the end of  an 
infinite set is not that the end is so far away, but that the end is non-existent.  
 To forestall misunderstandings, note that the idea of  comparing infinite sets in magnitude 
is to be rejected not because it would take an infinite amount of  time to perform—such a 
process is clearly a gedankenexperiment taking place in the timeless logical realm, and immune 
to objections drawn from the temporal realm—but because it is logically impossible; there is 
no way to exhaust the supposedly smaller set, and so no way to find an unmatched element 
in the supposedly larger one.  I know, too, that criticism of  this and other instances of  
misleading mathematical terminology can easily be misconstrued as an attack on the 
professional practices of  working mathematicians; I intend no such thing.  The results 
achieved by Cantor, and those built on them, are so important to modern mathematics 
that any criticism of  them is liable to be greeted by mathematicians as biologists greet 
critiques of  Darwinian evolution.  But my critique is not a demand that we abolish the 
Cantorian set, only a plea that we stop misinterpreting it.  I have no problem with the use 
by mathematicians of  Cantor’s concrete results; my quarrel is only with the misuse, as I see 
it, of  some traditional terms to describe such results—an abuse that may hold no dangers 
for mathematicians themselves, who understand each other, but often make for serious 
misunderstandings on the part of  the laity.13  
The rhetoric of  mathematics
When mathematicians create a new mathematical object, they generally label it with a 
name that reflects some resemblance it seems to have to a familiar object or quality. 
Open a mathematical encyclopedia or dictionary, and you will find many such names, all 
sounding familiar to laymen for the good reason that they are all common English words, 
but all of  which have meanings in mathematics that are severely technical, and to which 
their ”popular” names give no clue.  Examples: ring, group, manifold, class, graph, curl, domain, 
flag, ideal, kernel, lattice, map, matrix, model, pontoon, obelisk, path, pencil, ray, field, space, hull, 
martingale—the number could be greatly increased if  there were any need to do so.  Not 
one of  these mathematical objects can even begin to be understood on the basis of  their 
names, but that doesn’t matter in most cases; the objects themselves are the concern only 
of  mathematicians, and they are not misled.  But there are a few such names whose capacity 
to mislead does matter, sometimes very much.  I argued earlier that “dimension” was one 
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such; I make the same argument with respect to the post-Cantorian use of  “infinity.”  It 
must be remembered that Cantor himself  insisted on the significance of  his concept of  
infinity beyond the mathematical world; he contended that it had profound consequences 
for philosophy and even for theology, and spent many of  his later years more involved in 
those studies than in mathematics14.
 What Cantor actually conceived is a new kind of  mathematical object with some 
interesting and novel properties.  It has proved to be a useful concept, opening up 
many new possibilities for mathematicians, and potentially for scientists.  What is being 
questioned here is not the admissibility of  the concept, but its identification with the much 
older concept of  the infinite.  It is my contention that Cantorian sets have no more to do 
with the traditional infinite than  the mathematical object called a field has to do with a 
pasture, or the mathematical ring with a hula hoop.  There is nothing illegitimate about the 
Cantorian set, nothing wrong with positing a kind of  set whose members are in one-to-
one correspondence with those of  its own proper subset (or of  a number that is somehow 
the cardinal of  an infinite set)—but that something is not the infinite.  The giveaway here 
is the idea that such sets, while all infinite, can be shown to be greater and lesser than 
others; insofar as these entities are assigned the attribute of  magnitude, it is clear that they 
are not what all Western thinkers from the pre-Socratics to Cantor himself  thought of  as 
infinite.  Cantor has not refined the traditional concept of  the infinite, he has changed the 
subject.  He had every right to do so, and I have no desire of  driving mathematicians out 
of  the paradise that he created for them; I would only observe that Cantor was even more 
creative than he is usually given credit for—he did not merely refine the existing concept 
of  the infinite, but created a completely new creature in the mathematical world.  
Foundations: castles in the air
It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason to complete its speculative structures 
as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are 
reliable.  All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to assure ourselves of 
their solidity,  or rather indeed to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and so 
dangerous an enquiry.  —Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.
Throughout much of  the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the greatest 
mathematicians and logicians, like Frege and Peano and Russell, who interested 
themselves in the foundations of  mathematics were divided into warring camps: some 
called themselves Platonists, and believed that mathematical objects existed absolutely, and 
were discovered, not invented, by man; others called themselves empiricists, or believers 
in psychologism, or intuitionism, or formalism, or logicism15.  What is most remarkable about 
the conflict among these various schools of  thought, some of  which persists to this 
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day, is how little it mattered to working mathematicians.  Even those, like Brouwer and 
Kronecker, who differed vehemently with most of  their colleagues on supposedly basic 
ideas, continued working for the most part with the same criteria of  what constituted a 
proof.  Almost everyone agreed, in practice, on what was and was not an important result, 
and most mathematicians, if  they gave the mathematical philosophers any thought at all, 
dismissed them as mystics and dreamers—or simply as superannuated elder statesmen of  
the profession who couldn’t do real mathematics anymore, and were reduced to arguing 
about philosophy.
 This problem of  the infinite, if  it is a problem, appears in the very foundations of  
mathematics, but despite that—or perhaps because of  that—it is hardly important to 
mathematicians; they are very little interested in or affected by “foundations”—it hardly 
matters what mathematicians believe, because their beliefs have almost nothing to do 
with how they work.  It may not matter to mathematics, then, whether mathematicians 
talk as if  one infinite set could be greater than another, any more than it mattered for 
many centuries that astronomers believed that the sun revolved around the earth—their 
observations and results were limited not by their beliefs about what we now call the solar 
system, but by their instruments and computing powers.  But even if  it did matter, and 
mathematics were partially disabled by current views on infinity, there is something still 
deeper and more ominous to be feared here.  The current acceptance of  the concept of  
greater and lesser infinities reflects a loss of  nerve on our part, a loss of  faith in our own 
experience as something that has to be satisfied by any proposed hypothesis.  
Paradox lost: the cost of  changing the locus of  reality
I have claimed that the confusions and misunderstandings that have been reviewed here 
can lead to real trouble, well beyond the mere confusion on the part of  laymen about what 
mathematicians and scientists have really discovered.  What I have in mind is the loss of  
that vitally necessary intellectual tool, the paradox.  The history of  Western philosophy is 
in large part the history of  our confrontation with and resolution of  paradoxes (I mean the 
serious logical paradoxes — the antinomies — not the merely verbal ones that are really 
just puns), the seemingly faultless reasoning that leads to the obviously false conclusion. 
When we are confronted by a paradox we know that there is an error somewhere in the 
process that led us inexorably to that conclusion, and analyzing that chain of  reasoning at 
least sometimes lets us uncover that error, and thereby learn something that usually applies 
much more widely than just to the example at hand.  Rarely if  ever does the error turn 
out to lie in any of  the explicit steps of  reasoning that led us to the false conclusion; it is 
virtually always due to some overlooked ambiguity in our terms, some assumption built 
into one of  them that we were unconscious of.  And the resolution of  that ambiguity, the 
uncovering of  that faulty assumption, often leads in turn to a clarification that benefits us 
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in realms far beyond that in which we started.
 The best-known example of  such a paradox is that of  Achilles and the Tortoise, which 
has led to great refinements in our concept of  the infinite and the infinitesimal, even 
though it is not, even today, solved in a way that satisfies us simply and directly—that is, 
there is no explanation of  the paradox that is couched in the same verbal terms in which 
it was posed.  We are told about infinite series that converge to a value of  1, but this does 
little more than repeat what we knew already, that the conclusion is false—what we want 
is to be shown exactly where the verbal statement of  the situation is wrong.  That paradox 
of  Zeno’s made us think, and is still making us think more than two thousand years after 
being propounded, because it posed a perfectly clear contradiction: we could put our finger 
on no flaw in Zeno’s reasoning, but it led to a conclusion we knew absolutely to be false—
Achilles does catch up with the tortoise, always. And the flat contradiction between the 
apparently inexorable conclusion and our experience-based certainty that the conclusion 
is false is what gives the paradox its value, makes it something from which we can learn. 
But what shall we do when the conclusion to which a chain of  reasoning leads is highly 
surprising, even incredible, but not as unarguably counterfactual as the proposition that 
Achilles will never catch the tortoise?  We are liable, nowadays, to accept the conclusion to 
which pure reasoning seems to have led, however bizarre, rather than reject it and look for 
the misstep that led us there.  I think that if  the paradox of  Achilles and the Tortoise were 
propounded for the first time today, many would passively accept its conclusion, and argue 
that if  we seemed to be able to catch tortoises, that was only an illusion we entertained in 
order to protect our egos.
 That is at least one of  the causes, I think, of  the various absurd notions that have been 
reviewed here.  When a scientist tells us that we should credit machines with at least the 
potential for thought because a machine might someday hold a conversation with us that 
cannot be distinguished from one with an average person; or that an advance in logic has 
been made that enables us to extract precise numeric values from vague verbiage; or that 
the number of  parameters currently fashionable physical theories require implies the same 
number of  dimensions in actual space; or that highly intelligent extraterrestrial beings not 
only exist, but can be communicated with, and have much of  value to teach us (and perhaps 
are even visiting us now, albeit with no clear idea in mind); or that one can treat the infinite 
as if  it were finite, and compare two infinities to see which is larger, many of  us tend to 
react with a kind of  dumb fatalism.  We aren’t sure we really believe these things, but then 
so many of  the things we always believed seem to have been proven false, and so many 
bizarre ideas seem to have been shown to be true, that we cannot stir ourselves to resist 
these impostures even if  we cannot totally accept them.  In doing so, we deprive ourselves 
of  one of  rationality’s greatest tools, that deliberately contrived case of  the paradox called 
reductio ad absurdam; to employ it, we must first agree that certain things are absurd, and 
nowadays who dares dismiss any proposition as absurd?  And one of  the principal causes 
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of  this loss is that the tools invented for their own use by mathematicians and scientists 
drag with them highly dubious ideas that go on to infect the general population, although 
the mathematicians and scientists themselves, like Typhoid Marys, suffer no ill effects from 
the pathogen they spread.  
 Throughout most of  Western history, the notion that there are smaller and larger 
infinities, for example, would have been taken as one of  those paradoxical results that 
mean that we have erred somewhere, and even as late as the early 20th century many 
eminent mathematicians so took it.  But today our intellectual self-confidence fails us in 
such straits.  When we are faced with highly surprising results that do not, like footraces 
between men and tortoises, fall within our actual or at least imaginable experience, we 
find ourselves unable to declare them paradoxical, and hence to use them to find faults 
in our methods or assumptions; we have been beaten down by too many other results 
that seemed unacceptable, but proved to be unassailable.  We have been forced to accept 
quantum mechanics, of  which it has been said that if  it begins to seem comprehensible 
to you, you should see a therapist immediately; we have sadly accepted that Einstein was 
wrong, and that God does play dice with the world.  And so the burden of  proof  has shifted. 
No longer do newly conjectured theoretical objects have to establish their right of  entry 
into the house of  mathematics and science; all are admitted unless critics can prove they 
should not be, and the only grounds for excluding any newcomer is that it is inconsistent 
with those already admitted.  (And one wonders when that last barrier will crumble; how 
long can it be before some advanced thinker proclaims that science should follow the Walt 
Whitman Rule: “Do I contradict myself ?  Very well then I contradict myself, I am large, I 
contain multitudes.)”
 We have until recently demanded that any hypothesis not only work—that is, yield 
results that are consistent with the relevant observables—but explain—that is, show how 
those results fit in with our intuitive ideas and general knowledge of  the world.  But the 
two great achievements of  physics of  the last century, the Special and General Theories 
of  Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics, have imposed themselves on us by their superb 
satisfaction of  the first requirement alone: they work astonishingly well, so well that we 
commonly waive the other requirement, that of  making the world more intelligible and 
coherent.  We thereby gain many a valuable tool for predicting and controlling nature, 
even at the price of  feeling less and less sure that we ourselves are rational creatures 
whose  experience is the ground for our belief  and actions, and properly so.  This, I think, 
is a profound and profoundly disturbing development; when human beings give up their 
demand for coherence and intelligibility, and content themselves with what merely works, 
we have entered a new epoch in human thought—an epoch that is in many ways very like 
a past we thought we had transcended.  Pure reason, followed blindly, seems to be leading 
us back to an age of  magic and superstition.
Ontology Studies 8, 2008  186
Notes
(Endnotes)
1  “The Trouble With the Turing Test,” The New Atlantis (Winter 2006), pages 42-63.
2   Professor Maurice Wilkes (Memoirs of a Computer Pioneer [MIT Press, 1985], p. 197) writes 
that Turing told him in a letter that he was “not very pleased with [his paper]”; unfortunately, Turing did 
not make it clear just what aspect of the paper  he was dissatisfied with.
3  Quoted in  Mark Baard, “AI Founder Blasts Modern Research,” Wired News (May 13, 2003), 
pages 1-2, at page 2. 
     (www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1294,58714,00.html).
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